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The Gender Gap Concealed and Revealed: 1936-1984 
Emily Stoper 
California State University. Hayward 
Why do women vote so much like men-especially since they 
seem to think so difierently on many political issues? The gender 
gap in presidential elections has never been higher than the 
unimpressive 7.6 percent that it attained in 1984. 1 The answers 
to this question illustrate not just gender differences in political 
behavior but also the way in which the American electoral system 
works. Briefly, the answer offered by this paper is that women's 
views have been muffled by the process by which political issues 
are framed, defined as salient and presented to the voters. 
This interpretation, the reader should note, is very much at 
odds with the view held by most political scientists that the 
absence of a gender gap in voting is due to the similarity of views 
of women and men who have similar socio-economic 
characteristics. 2 There is a great deal of evidence that this theory 
is incorrect. This evidence will be traced from the suffrage move-
ment up through the 1984 presidential election. 
It is the thesis of this article that in at least three issue areas. 
all of which emerged during the suffrage battle. women have in 
fact voted differently in referenda and responded differently from 
men in polls and surveys. but that until the 1980s these 
differences have only rarely been translated (to a statistically 
significant degree) into different candidate votes or partisan 
affiliations due to certain peculiarities of the American political 
system. The three areas are: (1) political corruption, (2) war and 
peace, and (3) sumptuary legislation (now called "crimes without 
a victim"). The rest of this article will deal mainly with these three 
areas. The first presidential election year in which data from polls 
and surveys became available was 1936, so that date has been 
chosen as the start of the period under analysis. 
The Three Areas 
Let us now examine closely the three special areas in which 
women did display a distinctive political orientation: political 
reform, war and peace, and sumptuary legislation. The data are 
drawn from an examination of all the Gallup polls and as many 
surveys as could be obtained from the Survey Research Center 
at the University of Michigan. It is impossible to present all the 
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data here. so examples have been selected, but in no case have 
data that contradicted the thesis been suppressed or ignored. 
Inalmost every case gender gaps in cross-tabulations ofless than 
5 points and in polls of less than 3 points were not considered 
statistically significant and therefore not reported. though they 
were not seen as counter-evidence when there were data from 
other years that were significant on a particular issue. 
Polltlcal Reform and Gender 
Let us tum first to political reform. For the 1920s. when this 
issue was highly salient in American politics. unfortunately we 
do not have much survey or poll data. but we do lmow that 
women were very active in the charter reform movement whose 
purpose was to make it increasingly dilTicult for bosses and their 
machines to dominate local govemment. 3 As late as 1959, men 
in Dahl's survey of the political participation and views of a cross-
section of New Haven's population were far more likely than 
women to be opposed to charter revision (by 37 compared to 19 
percent) .4 In five different recent SRC election surveys. women 
were more likely than men to perceive dishonest people in 
government. (In each case. a three-point scale was used.) 
M w 
1958 "Hardly Any" 29 23 
1972 "Quite a Few" 35 40 
1976 "Quite a Few" 40 47 
1980 "Quite a Few" 44 51 
1984 "Many" 31 36 
War, Peace and Gender 
There are numerous illustrations of the second major area 
in which women's political views differed from men's. In response 
to all the following questions in Gallup polls women were more 
non-interventionist than men. (Throughout this paper. all dates 
from Gallup between 1935 and 1971 are from the 1935-71 
volumes. Months are given where they seem relevant.) 
Should the Constitution be changed to require 
a national vote before Congress could draft 
%Yes 
M W 
menfor war overseas?6 44 58 
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Should Congress give the anny the right 
to send drafted soldiers to any part of the 
world, notjust North and South America and 
%Yes 
M W 
US possessions?6 49 36 
Suppose the German army gets rid of Hitler, 
gives up all the countries Germany has 
conquered and offers to make peace . Should 
we make peace or continue fighting until the 
German army is completely defeated'?' 
"Continue fighting": 76 64 
Foreshadowing their views on Vietnam, women were far 
more likely than men to say we were not right to get into the 
fighting in Korea and more likely to advocate pulling out. 8 
Women's noninterventionist views did not necessarily imply 
indifference to the fate of people living in foreign countries. 
Women were more likely than men to be willing to prolong food 
rationing here in order to send food to people in other nations. 9 
It would appear that women are not "isolationists" but rather 
"cooperative internationalists," as distinct from "militant inter-
nationalists". 10 
The gender gap between women and men on attitudes 
toward war has persisted across many years . In 1958 and 1960 
men were considerably more likely to disagree with the view that 
"isolationism" is best for the US.11 In 1962, by 55 to 38%, men 
were more likely than women to favor resumption of nuclear 
testing in the atmosphere. 12 In 1983, men were far more likely 
than women (by 52 to 42 percent) to believe that falling behind 
in the arms race (as opposed to continuing the arms buildup) 
created the greater danger of nuclear war occurring. 13 
The war in Vietnam set gender dilierences in attitudes 
toward war in high relief. 
Are you a "hawk" with regard to the 
%Yes 
M W 
Vietnam War?14 39 23 
Should Congress vote to bring home all US 
troops before the end of the following year? 15 46 64 
52 
Were we right in getting into the.fighting in 
Vietnam? 16 
%Yes 
M W 
38 25 
Women were repeatedly considerably more likely to favor 
immediate withdrawal and less likely to favor a "stronger stand. " 17 
What action should the US take if another 
nation is attacked by communist -backed 
forces? 18 "Send American troops" 
M W 
37 18 
Perhaps because they knew that it was men who were 
making the decisions about war and peace, women were more 
anxious and pessimistic than men. For example: 
How worried are you about the chances 
that a world atomic war will break out? 19 
'Very Worried" (3-point scale): 
M W 
15 27 
Finally, women are more likely to take a pacifist position. 
Some people feel that war is an outmoded 
way of settling differences between nations 
(A}, others that wars are sometimes necessary 
M W 
(BJ. With which do you agree'/l 0 A: 43 48 
B: 49 38 
Thus, the poll and survey data over many years establish a 
striking gender difference on the issues of war and peace. But 
were women able to translate their peace orientation into candi-
date votes? Not at all. In the 1940 presidential election, the 
gender gap was an insignificant 2. 7 percentage points, with 
women slightly preferringWillkie. the Republican candidate . The 
gap in 1944 was virtually non-existent. When asked to give 
reasons for their 1940 vote. voters' responses indicated that they 
did not perceive any difference between the candidates on 
likelihood of going to war.21Similarly, in the 1950s Cold War era 
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women had no hope of having their more non-interventionist 
views represented in Washington . 
The same frustration persisted into the Vietnam Era . In three 
1967 polls, women more than men by 50-45, 45-38 and 55-48% 
favored the peace candidate Robert Kennedy (over the war leader 
Lyndon Johnson) as the 1968 Democratic nominee. 22 By 52 to 
44%, they also preferred Robert Kennedy to Nixon, whereas men 
hadexactlythereversepreference . Yettheyneverhadtheopportunity 
to vote for Kennedy or for any other peace candidate in the 1968 
general election . They were about 5 points more likely to vote for 
Humphrey than men, about equally likely to vote for Nixon and 
about 5 points less likely to vote for George Wallace . Since there was no 
clear peace candidate and there were other issues involved (such 
as race). it is difficult to interpret this outcome. but it does seem 
clear at least that Wallace, whose running mate was Air Force 
General Curtis LeMay. was the most hawkish of the three 
candidates. In 1972, with the Vietnam War still dragging on, 
women were some 6.6 points more likely to vote for the peace 
candidate. George McGovem 23-a rare instance of the political 
process offering women an opportunity to translate their prefer-
ence for peace into votes for a candidate . 
Alcohol, Marijuana and Gender 
Women have been extraordinarily more favorable than men 
to Prohibition and its latter-day versions. The limited data we 
have about women's actual voting in the 1920s show their 
preference for enforcement of Prohibition clearly. 24 In the 1920 
election in Chicago, where separate records by sex were kept for 
a few years, women were almost two and a half times as likely to 
vote for the Prohibition Party as men. Women were more likely to 
vote Prohibition in all wards, regardless of class. race and 
ethnicity . As late as 1954, 41 percent of women said they would 
vote for Prohibition, compared to 25 percent of men. 2 5 By 1984 
these figures had been roughly cut in half. but the same gender 
gap ex:isted .26 In spite of the persistence of a substantial minority 
of pro-dry women, Prohibition has not been an issue on the 
national political agenda since the repeal of the 18th Amendment 
in 1933. 
In the 1980s women continue to be considerably more 
willing than men to use state power to limit alcohol consumption. 
%Yes 
M W 
Should a person who drives a car after 
having more than one drink be sent to jail?l 7 38 50 
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Do you favor afederal law requiring 
health and safety warning labels on 
alcoholic beverage contafners?28 
Do youfavor federal excise taxes on 
alcoholic beverages to raise revenues to 
fight drug and alcohol abuse?29 
%Yes 
M W 
74 84 
61 70 
In the 1970s, a new "prohibition" issue replaced the old one : 
legalization of marijuana. Women have consistently been far 
more likely than men to oppose legalization of marijuana and to 
advocate a stiffer penalty for sale and use .30 In these surveys and 
polls , 25-30 percent of men and only 15-20 percent of women 
have favored the legalization of marijuana. 
A Miscellany of Diversity 
In addition to the three areas presented above, there are 
several other areas in which women have had significantly 
different attitudes from men over the long term . The most impor-
tant one is social welfare spending. 31 Before the 1950s (but not 
since then), women were more feminist than men in their 
attitudes toward women 's status .32 Women seem to be slightly 
less racist than men (though the dilferences are not large). as 
Judged by their responses to questions on making lynching a 
federal crime 33 and on whether the government in Washington 
should assure fair treatment for "Negroes" in jobs and housing. 34 
No studies turned up in which women appeared more racist than 
men. 
Perhaps consistent with their greater disapproval (and 
lesser use) of alcohol and marijuana, women were also more 
opposed to gambling. 35 In addition, they were far more likely than 
men to favor gun control. 
M W 
Should registration of aUfirearms be 
required?l 6 ''Yes" 61 82 
The above data may be understood to mean that women 
favor a greater degree of state control over individual behavior 
than men. However, other data indicate that women balk at some 
methods of control that men are more likely to approve. In nu-
55 
merous Gallup polls women were less supportive of the death 
penalty than men. 37 Women were also significantly less likely 
than men to favor stricter discipline in the schools, 38 wiretap-
ping39 and whipping of criminals. 40 
Sources of Women's Different Views 
Thus, in three issue areas (political corruption, war and 
peace and sumptuary legislation). women had distinctly differ-
ent views from men. The three areas, as well as the miscellaneous 
other differences just cited, may have emerged from what Carol 
Gilligan has called "a different voice," by which she means a 
moral perspective that emphasizes a home-based community or 
network based on nurturance and service to others.41 For 
example, women's enthusiasm for Prohibition doubtless came 
from their view of liquor as disrupting home and community 
through illness. accidents. violence and misspent paychecks. 
Women's apparently greater moralism in general may also 
have come from their stronger attachment to religion. Consis-
tently over the years. women were about 8 percentage points 
more likely than men to attend church. 42 Women were more 
likely than men (66 versus 47 percent, on a four-point scale) to 
say that religion was "very important" in their lives. 43 
Finally, women's greater willingness to limit consumption of 
alcohol and marijuana (as well as their greater opposition to 
gambling and guns) may come from the fact that they themselves 
have been consistently less likely to indulge. In 1947 only 54 
percent of women said they drank, compared with 72 percent of 
men: in 1983 the figures were remarkably similar. 58 versus 71 
percent. 44 Men, especially college students, were also far more 
likely to admit to having used marijuana. 45 
Women's Views and Party Platforms 
U.S. political parties have always drawn their strength from 
shifting coalitions of interest groups and have lacked any very 
clear and consistent ideological perspective. In all three of the 
issue areas discussed above, the two major U.S. parties have 
reversed their positions over the years, while women's views have 
remained constant. In two cases, political reform and peace, the 
position supported by women moved form conservative (Repub-
lican) to liberal (Democratic). In the other case. sumptuary laws, 
the position supported by women moved form liberal (Demo-
cratic) to conservative (Republican). These confusing switches by 
the parties help explain why women (along with most other 
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groups in the population) have not been able to unite as a voting 
bloc and thus use the political parties as a vehicle to express their 
views. 
For a long time, political scientists held the mistaken view 
that women were simply more conservative than men. This was 
based largely on the work of European political scientists 46 who 
had observed a fairly strong tendency of women to vote more con-
servative than men in Europe. for reasons that were unique to the 
European party system, where the left parties were mostly based 
on unions. which had largely male membership. Since the 
middle 1970s, women in Europe have no longer been voting 
conservative. 47 They never consistently did so on this side of the 
Atlantic. 
In the U.S., Prohibition and cleaning up local government 
had both been part of the MProgressive" package of reforms that 
had promised to use government to elevate the moral level of 
society, beginning in the 1880s. This same package had included 
public health, public education, social services for the poor and 
other reforms that would still today clearly be considered liberal. 
However, by the 1920s and '30s the package had broken into 
several parts and the Prohibition and charter reform parts were 
not supported by most of the Democratic Party. Many Demo-
cratic o!Ticeholders were or had been machine politicians them-
selves. Others perceived that Mreformed" charters tended to favor 
the election of Republicans. Democrats also tended to oppose 
Prohibition because an important part of their base-urban, 
immigrant, Catholic voters-saw nothing wrong with a little 
drink, whereas the rural native-born Protestants who (outside 
the South) voted Republican were more likely to favor total 
abstinence, often on religious grounds . On the other hand, New 
Deal Democrats were strong supporters of social welfare legisla-
tion . They pushed through social security, Aid to Dependent 
Children, unemployment insurance, etc. Republicans, while 
closer to women on war, prohibition and political reform, were 
opponents of social welfare measures. 
For some women voters. peace was the most salient issue, 
the one that determined their vote; for others it was sumptuary 
laws; for others it was political reform. Therefore one does not see 
a strong and consistent party voting pattern for women and the 
voting data would not necessarily reveal a tendency by any given 
women to vote, say, non-interventionist, prohibitionist and 
political reformist, even though there probably is a tendency for 
individual women to favor all three of these positions. 
The issue of peace. like that of Prohibition. has shifted its 
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ideological label. Peace had been more a Republican issue in the 
1930s. when non-interventionist America Firsters like Republi-
can Senator Vandenberg were outspoken opponents of any poli-
cies that might lead to a second world war (against the rightist. 
anti-Communist Nazis) . Peace was identified with neither major 
U.S. party during the Cold War era of the 1940s and '50s. except 
that in 1952 Eisenhower successfully presented himself as the 
peace candidate during the Korean War, thus winning 54 percent 
of women's votes (and only 46 percent of men's votes) . Then peace 
rather suddenly became more a Democratic issue in the 1960s, 
in response to the disillusionment of many liberal Democrats 
with the Vietnam War and with the exercise of U.S. global power 
in general. Women's views had not shifted. In all the polls about 
all the wars. women have appeared more Mdovish" than men. no 
matter how the question was worded. 
Women's views have also remained the same on the issues 
of sumptuary laws and political reform, though the issues have 
changed their form somewhat. Prohibition of alcohol was long 
dead as a national political issue by the 1960s. but prohibition 
of marijuana had replaced it. Prohibition of alcohol had originally 
in the 1880s been part of a MProgressive" package of reforms that 
also included women's suffrage , free public education, public 
health laws and other measures that we would today call liberal. 
The new prohibition (of marijuana) was clearly more strongly 
identified as a conservative position. Both the old and the new 
prohibitions tended to be favored more by women than by men. 
Once again: liberals and conservatives had shifted positions; 
women had remained constant. 
City charter reform still exists as an issue, as a few cities like 
San Francisco and Oakland still fight over whether to have 
district or city -wide elections: just as in the past Democrats and 
liberals tend to oppose the reform position (city-wide elections). 
In the 1920s charter reform was a major issue; today it is so 
lacking in salience that no recent poll nor survey data on it was 
obtainable. The more important reforms today in the area of 
political corruption are public financing of campaigns . financial 
disclosure laws and bans on gifts to candidates and influence 
peddling. And it is the liberals, through groups like Common 
Cause. who are more likely to support these reforms. though here 
again there are no poll or survey data broken down by gender. 
However, in the 1970s and '80s women were significantly (by 4.6 
to 6 . 7 percentage points) more likely than men to say there were 
Mquite a few" dishonest people in government. 48 
In summary. two out of three of the Mwomen·s positions" 
(political reform and peace). as well as most of the miscellaneous 
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views discussed, are on the liberal side of the political spectrum. 
(In the 1930s all three-prohibition. political reform and peace-
were on the conseIVative side. but the impact of this alignment 
was neutralized by women's greater tendency to support social 
welfare measures.) This unprecedented recent alignment helps 
explain the emergence of the "gender gap" in the 1980 election-
and why it is now in a liberal direction. If there were a political 
party or movement articulating all of women's preferences into a 
coherent political philosophy, the gender gap might grow much 
larger. 
After all. women's views-in favor of peace. sumptuary laws. 
and political reform-have remained unchanged. The party 
system has simply changed its definition of what was "liberal" 
and what was "conseIVative ... thus making it appear that women 
had made a shift that had pushed them to the left of the shadowy 
center line of American politics. 
Of course. it is not reasonable to expect that women's 
positions on the issues will explain their voting behavior entirely. 
We cannot ignore factors such as perceptions of the candidates 
and party loyalty. These two factors certainly play some role for 
voters of both sexes. However, it is not true. as some political 
scientists have argued. that women are more candidate-oriented 
than men. as opposed to party- or issue-oriented. 49 The case that 
women were more candidate-oriented seems to have been based 
almost entirely on a misperception of a single presidential 
election. that of 1952. 50 Women's preference for Eisenhower is 
much more plausibly explained with reference to the issue of 
peace, as I have argued above. 
When we examine women's party loyalty. an interesting 
picture emerges. Most of the time men. not women. have been 
more likely (in varying degrees. some quite small). to be inde-
pendents. Le .. to have no party affiliation. 51 However, women 
were more likely to attribute their party identification to habit or 
inheritance; men were more likely to attribute theirs to agree-
ment with their party's perceived beliefs or identification with 
social groups they perceived the party as representing. 52 Thus, 
it appears that women have displayed more party loyalty than 
men in spite of the fact that neither party reflected their issue 
preferences with any consistency but out of habit and because 
family ties have perhaps been more salient for them. In short. 
women's reasons for greater party loyalty actually reflect the 
failure of either party to offer consistent support for their issue 
preferences. 
Women have not voted in a way that was as clearly and easily 
explained by socio-economic status (SES) as men's votes. High 
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SES men are more likely to vote Republican than high SES 
women and low SES men are more likely to vote Democratic than 
low SES women. Berelson et al see this as evidence that women 
are Wiess politicized" than men. 53 Perhaps a better interpretation 
is that SES is simply not as powerful an influence on women's 
party choice, since it is diluted by the influence of gender. In the 
area of voter turnout. on the other hand, where SES and gender 
point in the same directions, SES seems to have a more powerful 
influence on women than on men. Native-born, white and 
middle-class women vote more than foreign-born, Black, and 
working-class women respectively-to a greater degree than this 
is true among men. 54 
The important point of this analysis, however, is that women 
have sustained consistent, long-term differences from men in 
their positions on several important issues yet have rarely 
translated these differences into a significant gender gap in 
voting. Even the much-touted gender gaps of the 1980 and '84 
presidential elections have amounted to less than 8 percent. 
Even in elections that offered a very clear ideological choice 
between liberal and conservative, as currently defined by the 
parties, neither alternative has consistently reflected women's 
distinctive views, which did not (and never have) clearly coin-
cided with either liberalism or conservatism. 
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